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Breach of statutory duty in the Supreme Court: Formalism 
triumphs over functionality 
 
Eleanor J Russell 
Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
The author examines the thorny issue of breach of statutory duty in light of the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Campbell v Gordon [2016] UKSC 38 where 
the court required to determine whether provisions in the Employers’ Liability 
(Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 provided the basis for an action for breach 
of statutory duty against a sole company director. 
 
Introduction 
Some statutes provide that breach of their provisions gives rise to an action 
for breach of statutory duty by someone who is damnified by the breach. The 
Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 and the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 
are notable examples. Other statutes (for example, the Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974, s.47) provide that no such action will arise in event of 
breach of their provisions. Difficulties arise, however, where a particular 
statute remains silent on the issue of whether civil liability results from a 
breach of its provisions. In such situations, the courts are faced with the task 
of determining Parliament’s unstated intention, a task which has been likened 
to solving a “guesswork puzzle” (Island Records Ltd v Corkindale [1978] Ch. 
122, per Lord Denning M.R. at pp.134–135). While certain presumptions exist 
to assist the courts, the judges’ task is far from an easy one, as the recent 
case of Campbell v Gordon [2016] UKSC 38; [2016] 3 W.L.R. 294 
demonstrates. Indeed, at the Supreme Court stage of the litigation, reference 
was made (by Lord Toulson at para.35) to Judge Richard Posner’s statement 
to the effect that “[t]he judges face hieroglyphs without a Rosetta Stone.” 
(Divergent Paths-The Academy and the Judiciary, Harvard University Press, 
2016, p.172). In this article, the author tracks the judicial path of the litigation 
in Campbell having first set out the facts of the case, the relevant statutory 
framework and the existing authorities. The author concludes that the litigation 
in Campbell illustrates the difficulty of predicting how courts might respond to 
particular statutory provisions and suggests that reform of the law is overdue.  
 
Campbell v Gordon - the alleged facts 
The pursuer, an apprentice joiner, sustained injuries in June 2006 in the 
course of his employment with the first defenders, Peter Gordon Joiners Ltd.  
The company went into voluntary liquidation in December 2009 and there 
were no company funds available to meet the pursuer’s claim. The employers' 
liability insurance taken out by the company excluded any legal liability arising 
out of the use of electrically powered woodworking machinery, which was the 
very context in which the pursuer’s injuries had been sustained, the accident 
having involved an electrically powered circular saw. The claim against the 
company was therefore worthless. Accordingly, the pursuer also sued the 
second defender, Peter Gordon, who was the sole director of the company 
and responsible for its day to day operation. It was alleged that the company’s 
failure to have in place appropriate insurance was a breach of its obligations 
under s.1(1) of the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 and 
that Mr. Gordon, who, as sole director, had arranged such insurance as there 
was, was liable under s.5 of that Act. 
  
The statutory framework 
Given that the task of the court in such cases is one of statutory construction, 
the key provisions of the 1969 Act require to be set out. Section 1 of the Act 
provides as follows: 
“1. Insurance against liability for employees. 
Except as otherwise provided by this Act, every employer carrying on any 
business in Great Britain shall insure, and maintain insurance, under one or 
more approved policies with an authorised insurer or insurers against liability 
for bodily injury or disease sustained by his employees, and arising out of and 
in the course of their employment in Great Britain in that business …” 
Section 5 of the Act goes on to provide: 
“5. Penalty for failure to insure. 
An employer who on any day is not insured in accordance with this Act when 
required to be so shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary 
conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale; and where an 
offence under this section committed by a corporation has been committed 
with the consent or connivance of, or facilitated by any neglect on the part of, 
any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the corporation, he, as well 
as the corporation shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be 
liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”  
These provisions of the Act have already received considerable judicial 
attention, as will be discussed below.  
 
Existing authorities in England and Scotland 
The Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 applies both in 
Scotland and in England and Wales. (It has no application in Northern Ireland-
see s.7 of the Act). It should be said at the outset that there is no express 
provision in the 1969 Act creating civil liability on the part of an employer for 
the failure to insure. The Act is silent on the matter. Prior to the litigation in 
Campbell v Gordon, there had, however, been attempts to found an action for 
breach of statutory duty based upon the provisions of the Act. Interestingly, 
different results had ensued north and south of the border. In Richardson v 
Pitt-Stanley [1995] QB 123, the English Court of Appeal (by a majority) held 
that the 1969 Act did not give rise to civil liability on an employer’s part and it 
would therefore be anomalous if civil liability was imposed on the employer’s 
directors or other officers. A relevant factor underlying the court’s decision 
was that breach of the Act would not occasion direct physical injury to the 
plaintiff but would involve him only in economic loss, namely an inability to 
recover damages from the relevant employer. Stuart-Smith LJ took the view 
that insurance was normally taken out to protect the insured (the employer) 
against the potentially disastrous consequences of a large claim and the Act 
should not be regarded as imposing a duty solely or principally for the 
protection of the employee. Stuart-Smith LJ also regarded the level of the fine 
capable of being imposed on the company and the delinquent director, as “to 
some extent a special penalty, a feature which militates against civil liability” 
(at p.133). While acknowledging that none of those reasons was 
determinative in itself, Stuart-Smith LJ took the view that cumulatively those 
reasons pointed strongly against the creation of any civil liability on the part of 
a director who had committed an offence under s.5 of the 1969 Act. The Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Richardson attracted academic criticism (see 
O’Sullivan, “Industrial Injuries and Compulsory Insurance-Adding Insult to 
Injury” (1995) CLJ 241) and in the subsequent Scottish case of Quinn v 
McGinty 1999 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 27, Sheriff Principal Bowen declined to follow it. 
The Scottish court took the view that the Act’s purpose was to protect 
employees from the risk of being deprived of lawful compensation - it was no 
part of the intention of Parliament to confer a benefit on employers. (This had 
also been the view of Sir John Megaw who had voiced a strong dissenting 
judgment in Richardson ([1995] QB 123 at p.135.) In Quinn, the sheriff 
principal (at p.29) found it “difficult to see that a statute compelling employers 
to effect insurance in relation to one category of risk only-namely, bodily injury 
or disease sustained by employees-and fencing that with a daily penalty, was 
intended to benefit or protect any class of persons other than those 
employees.” It followed, in the sheriff principal’s view, that the 1969 Act not 
only imposed an obligation on company officers to see that insurance was in 
place but it also gave a correlative right to a person affected to sue for breach 
of that obligation.  
The reference to class protection in both Richardson and Quinn is important. 
It has long been established that the question as to whether a statutory duty 
gives rise to a civil right of action requires consideration of the whole Act and 
the circumstances in which it was enacted. Certain indicators or presumptions 
pointing one way or the other have however been identified in a number of 
key cases. If a statutory duty is imposed but no remedy by way of penalty or 
otherwise for its breach is imposed, it can be assumed that a right of civil 
action accrues to the person who is injured by the breach - otherwise the 
statutory duty would be “but a pious aspiration” (per Lord Simonds in Cutler v 
Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] A.C. 398 at p.407). Where, however, a 
statute imposes an obligation and imposes a criminal penalty for non-
compliance, the general rule is that no civil liability arises (see Doe d Murray v 
Bridges (1831) 1 B & Ad 847 where Lord Tenterden CJ said (at p.859) that 
“where an Act creates an obligation, and enforces the performance in a 
specified manner, we take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be 
enforced in any other manner”. That general rule is itself subject to 
exceptions. The primary exception, (being the one which would become 
relevant to the arguments in Campbell v Gordon), is “where upon the true 
construction of the Act it is apparent that the obligation or prohibition was 
imposed for the benefit or protection of a particular class of individuals, as in 
the case of the Factories Acts and similar legislation” (per Lord Diplock in 
Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173 at p.185). Well-
known examples of the application of the exception can be found in Groves v 
Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402 which related to obligations to fence 
machinery in the Factory and Workshop Act 1878 and Black v Fife Coal Co 
Ltd 1912 S.C. (H.L.) 33 which concerned the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1887. 
In both cases, contravention of the relevant statutory provision was 
punishable by way of fine but an action on the statute was nonetheless 
permitted at the instance of the injured worker in Groves and on behalf of the 
deceased workman in Black. In Black, Lord Kinnear said (at p.45): 
“We are to consider the scope and purpose of the statute, and in particular for 
whose benefit it is intended. Now the object of the present statute is plain. It 
was intended to compel mineowners to make due provision for the safety of 
the men working in their mines, and the persons for whose benefit all these 
rules are to be enforced are the persons exposed to danger. But when a duty 
of this kind is imposed for the benefit of particular persons, there arises at 
common law a correlative right in those persons who may be injured by its 
contravention. Therefore I think it is quite impossible to hold that the penalty 
clause detracts in any way from the prima facie right of the persons for whose 
benefit the statutory enactment has been passed to enforce the civil liability.” 
On the other hand, statutes which establish a regulatory system for the benefit 
of the public at large tend not to support a right of action: see Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 at pp. 
731-2. (See, also, R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, Ex parte Hague 
[1992] 1 AC 58 where an action founded upon the Prison Rules 1964 was 
denied, the rules being said to be “regulatory in character” (per Lord Jauncey 
at p.172)) and Morrison Sports Ltd v Scottish Power UK plc 2010 UKSC 37; 
2011 S.C. (UKSC) 1; 2010 S.L.T. 1027 which concerned a general regulatory 
scheme intended for the benefit of the public at large. For a fuller discussion 
of the various indicators and presumptions which apply in this area of law, see 
J Thomson (ed.), Delict (SULI/ W Green, 2007), ch. 6). 
    
Campbell v Gordon-its journey through the courts 
Clearly, the courts’ decisions in Richardson and Quinn were at variance. In 
Campbell v Gordon [2016] UKSC 38, the Scottish courts had the opportunity 
to revisit the issue of whether an action for breach of statutory duty could be 
maintained in terms of the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 
1969 against a company director. 
 
Approach of the Lord Ordinary [2013] CSOH 181; 2014 SLT 178 
The matter came to debate before Lord Glennie. The second defender, Mr. 
Gordon, sought dismissal on the ground that the claim against him was 
irrelevant. He submitted that s.5 of the 1969 Act did not give rise to civil 
liability on his part as company director. Lord Glennie observed that s.1 of the 
Act placed the obligation on the employer (in this case, the company) to 
maintain the requisite insurance. His Lordship further observed that s.5 dealt 
with the penalty faced by an employer who fails to insure in accordance with 
the Act and also provided that a director who has consented to, connived at 
or, by neglect, facilitated the offence, was “deemed to be guilty of that 
offence” and was liable to be proceeded against and punished in accordance 
with that section. The pursuer averred that the company’s commission of the 
offence was consented to or facilitated by the neglect of Mr. Gordon but Lord 
Glennie observed that that was not enough in itself to make Mr. Gordon civilly 
liable to the pursuer. His Lordship stated (at para.7) that “[i]n order to succeed 
in his action of damages against Mr. Gordon, the pursuer requires to establish 
that the section gives rise to civil liability on the part of Mr. Gordon, as director 
of the company.” Lord Glennie continued (at para.10) that the employer’s 
obligation to insure was “clearly imposed for the benefit of the employees who 
could, in the event of the employer becoming insolvent and being unable to 
meet any claim for damages, look to the insurance policy under the Third 
Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930 (and see now the 2010 Act)...” 
While Lord Glennie accepted that there may also have been a desire to 
protect a company from being driven into insolvency by large uninsured 
claims that was not the prime consideration. His Lordship continued (at 
para.10): 
“The duty, after all, is placed on the employer, and the obvious purpose is not 
to save it from itself but to protect its employees from being left without a 
remedy. That being the case, that is a strong indication that the statutory 
obligation is civilly actionable at the suit of an employee, notwithstanding that 
a hefty criminal sanction is imposed on the employer by s.5 …” 
The Lord Ordinary then turned his attention to the position of the director, 
manager, secretary or other officer of the corporate employer and observed 
that the position of those persons was dealt with somewhat differently. His 
Lordship continued (at para.11): 
“They are not mentioned in s.1 of the Act. Their liability to criminal sanctions 
when the offence of not having insurance has been committed with their 
consent or connivance or has been facilitated by their neglect is imposed by 
s.5. In terms of that section they are “deemed to be guilty” of the offence 
committed by the corporation. It might therefore be argued that the Act does 
not place any obligation on them to procure that the employer has in force the 
relevant insurance. To my mind this would be too narrow a reading of the Act. 
It is clear from s.5 that if the company's failure to effect and maintain the 
relevant insurance is committed through their “fault”, to use a compendious 
expression, they are to be regarded as being guilty of the same failure as the 
company, that is to say the failure to effect and maintain the relevant 
insurance. That means that they were under a duty (albeit a qualified duty) to 
ensure that the relevant insurance was in place. That duty is imposed for the 
benefit of the employees of the company. In those circumstances they stand 
in the same position as the corporate employer, and there is no reason to 
consider that breach of that duty should not give rise to civil liability.” 
Having considered both Richardson and Quinn, Lord Glennie declared (at 
para.20) that he found the reasoning of Sheriff Principal Bowen in Quinn 
“compelling”. He agreed with the minority view of Sir John Megaw in 
Richardson that it was not Parliament’s intention in enacting the 1969 Act to 
confer a benefit on the employer. While protecting a corporate employer from 
his own folly might have been a secondary aim, the Act’s prime purpose was 
the protection of employees. While it was undesirable that courts in England 
and Scotland should come to different views on the effect of legislation which 
applies in both jurisdictions, Lord Glennie was ultimately unpersuaded by the 
reasoning of the majority in Richardson. The Court of Appeal’s decision was 
not binding on a Scottish court and Lord Glennie considered that it should not 
be followed. Lord Glennie accordingly concluded that the pursuer had pled a 
relevant case based on breach of statutory duty and allowed a proof on that 
issue. The second defender reclaimed. 
 
The Inner House [2015] CSIH 11; 2015 SC 453; 2015 SLT 178 
The reclaiming motion was heard by an Extra Division of the Inner House 
comprising Lord Brodie, Lord Malcolm and Lord Drummond Young. By a 
majority, the Division allowed the reclaiming motion and dismissed the 
pursuer’s action against the second defender. In this respect the Division 
arrived at the same conclusion, albeit not by identical reasoning, as the 
majority in Richardson. In Lord Brodie’s view, it did not necessarily follow that 
where a statute imposed a duty which is seen to be for the benefit of a 
particular group of people it must be construed as conferring a right on 
members of that group to sue on breach as the correlative of the duty.  
Lord Brodie quoted from the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in X (Minors), 
supra, wherein it was stated (at pp.731-2) that in the ordinary case, a breach 
of statutory duty did not, by itself, give rise to any private law cause of action, 
but that a private law cause of action would arise if it could be shown, as a 
matter of statutory construction, that the statutory duty was imposed for the 
protection of a limited class of the public and Parliament intended to confer on 
members of that class a private right of action for breach of the duty. Section 
1 of the 1969 Act clearly imposed a duty to insure, which had to be seen as 
being for the benefit of a particular group but that duty was imposed upon the 
employer and not its director, (Lord Brodie at paras.11 and 23) (see, also, 
Lord Malcolm at para.70). If the pursuer had a right, it was a right against the 
company and not against the director. Lord Brodie agreed with the majority in 
Richardson that there was no right to sue an insolvent and uninsured 
employer for the economic loss consequent upon its failure to insure. That 
pointed away from the imposition of liability on the second defender. Lord 
Brodie pointed out that in terms of s.5 of the 1969 Act, a director was 
“deemed to be guilty” of the same offence as committed by the employer but 
only the employer could be guilty of the offence. That seemed to underline 
that the obligation to insure lay with the corporate employer and not the 
corporate officer. Lord Brodie disagreed with the Lord Ordinary's reading of 
the expression "consent, connivance of or facilitated by any neglect" in s.5 as 
references to fault. The function of those words was merely to indicate causal 
connection. If, however, he was wrong on that point, such fault did not arise 
from a duty imposed by that section-the language of s.5 was not apt to create 
a duty that did not previously exist. Applying the usual principles of statutory 
construction, the 1969 Act would not be interpreted as creating a right in 
someone in the pursuer’s 's position to sue someone in the director’s position 
for the value of awards of damages for personal injuries against the first 
defender. Moreover, the law was slow to recognise a right to sue in respect of 
pure economic loss. In addition, company officers were not the guarantors of 
the company's solvency. Lord Brodie observed (at para.26) that “[b]y entering 
into a contract of employment or accepting appointment [a manager or 
company secretary or, indeed director of a limited company] is not 
undertaking to shoulder all the risks associated with the company's enterprise 
or to act as an insurer for the company's employees.” (See, also the 
observations of Lord Malcolm at para.67). Richardson had “stood for some 
ten years without provoking corrective legislation” (para.19) and although it 
was not formally binding, it would, in Lord Brodie’s view, represent a 
significant step for the Division to depart from its conclusion. While the 
Division had not been persuaded by every aspect of the reasoning in 
Richardson, the construction of the 1969 Act adopted by the majority was 
correct. For Lord Brodie (at para.20) it was “very significant that nowhere in 
the Act is a straightforward statement to the effect that an officer of a 
corporate employer has an obligation to effect insurance.” His Lordship 
continued (at para.20): “Construing the 1969 Act in such a way as to find a 
right conferred on an employee requires the Act to be construed as imposing 
a corresponding liability on the part of the company officer. Such liability … 
may be very onerous indeed. It appears to me that it is at least a factor to be 
had regard to that if a statute is to impose a liability, whether criminal or civil, it 
should do so in clear and explicit terms.” Lord Brodie stated (at para.23): “I do 
not find in the 1969 Act an obligation imposed on directors as opposed to 
employer companies. This is not a matter of subtle wording; as I read the 
statute the obligation is simply not there. A director may be made criminally 
responsible for a breach of the company's obligation but that is something 
different from the imposition of an obligation.” 
While Lord Malcolm agreed with Lord Brodie that the action against the 
second defender should be dismissed, Lord Drummond Young issued a 
dissenting judgment. In Lord Drummond Young’s view, s.5 of the 1969 Act, 
when taken with s.1, imposed civil liability upon any director who had 
consented to a corporation's failure to insure or who had connived in or 
facilitated any such failure, if the conditions set out in s.5 were satisfied. His 
Lordship proffered a number of reasons for extending civil liability to the 
directors. First, it was clear that the obligation in s.1 was intended for the 
benefit of particular persons, namely injured employees who were entitled to 
compensation. Secondly, the objectives and policy that underlay the Act 
supported the existence of civil liability. His Lordship observed (at para.41): “It 
is axiomatic that legislation should be construed purposively, in such a way as 
to give effect to its objectives and the policy that underlies it. Such an 
approach is apparent in cases such as Black v Fife Coal Co Ltd, Monk v 
Warbey and Houston v Buchanan. The purpose of compulsory insurance 
provisions is to ensure that funds are available to compensate persons who 
are injured and consequently have a claim for damages. That purpose would 
be frustrated if civil liability under the Act did not exist.” Lord Drummond 
Young stated (at para.42) that if Mr. Gordon’s argument (that the Act imposed 
civil liability only on the company and not the director) was correct then “the 
existence of civil liability under the Act would rarely if ever be of significance.” 
He continued (at para.42): “Where an employee has a claim for compensation 
for an accident at work, the employer is ex hypothesi liable, whether for 
negligence or breach of statutory duty. Thus if the employer is solvent there is 
no need to invoke the Act; an action directly against the employer will produce 
an effective remedy. It follows that the Act is only significant when the 
employer is insolvent. In that event, however, any right against the employer 
under sec 1 would be worthless, and the Act would be of no practical effect. 
The underlying purpose of the legislation thus supports the notion that a 
director who is complicit in breach of the statute should be liable as well as 
the employing company.”  
Lord Drummond Young further stated that a corporate employer could only 
act through its officers, who accordingly had a duty to ensure so far as 
possible that the company fulfilled its statutory duties, thus “it is apparent that 
section 1, by itself, has the effect of imposing a duty on the directors” 
(para.43). Citing the dictum of Atkin LJ in Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl 
Theatrical Syndicate [1924] 1 KB 1 at pp.14-15, Lord Drummond Young went 
on to state that the common law relating to directors' liability supported the 
view that a director who was complicit in a company's breach of the s.1 duty 
should be civilly liable to an injured employee. Moreover, where a director had 
been responsible for the company's failure to obtain insurance, it was possible 
that he ignored or deliberately disregarded the existence of the statutory duty 
and in that event he was personally liable for the failure. Lord Drummond 
Young saw nothing unfair in imposing such liability. Finally, the argument that 
the difference in structure between s.1 and s.5 indicated that the statutory 
intention was that a director should only be subject to criminal and not civil 
liability ran contrary to the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that 
effect should be given to the objectives and underlying policy of the statute. 
His Lordship stated (at para.47): ”It is not appropriate to frustrate that policy 
through an over-literal construction of the statute, or an excessively 
conceptual approach to its provisions. I think that the argument for the 
reclaimer can be considered excessively conceptual; it focuses on differences 
of structure that do not reflect the basic objectives of the statute. Moreover, 
the common law principles relating to directors' liability strongly suggest that 
the differences in wording between sec 1 and sec 5 relate to the importance 
of precision in the definition of a criminal offence rather than any difference of 
substance. So far as civil liability is concerned, I am of opinion that the 
objectives of the Act demand that a director who has consented to or who has 
been complicit in a breach of the duty to obtain insurance, or who has 
facilitated such a breach through neglect, should incur civil liability. This 
substantive point should prevail over structural niceties.” Lord Drummond 
Young considered the level of fine (which might be substantial) to be 
irrelevant to the question of whether civil liability existed, stating (at para.48) 
that “[t]he level of fine should not frustrate the fundamental purpose of the 
statute, namely the provision of compensation to injured employees.”   
It followed, in Lord Drummond Young’s view, that a director or other corporate 
officer might be liable in damages where a company was in breach of s.1 of 
the 1969 Act. Accordingly, he agreed not only with the Lord Ordinary in the 
present case, but also with the sheriff principal in Quinn and with Sir John 
Megaw in Richardson. Lord Drummond Young’s view was, however, a 
minority one. The Division, by majority, allowed the reclaiming motion and 
dismissed the pursuer’s claim against the second defender. The pursuer 
appealed to the Supreme Court.  
 
The Supreme Court 
The sole issue with which the appeal was concerned was whether civil liability 
attached to Mr. Gordon for the failure to insure. The issue was to split the 
Supreme Court as it had done the Inner House, the Supreme Court 
dismissing Mr. Campbell’s appeal by a majority of three to two. Lord Carnwath 
(with whom Lord Reed and Lord Mance agreed) delivered the leading 
judgment. Having observed (at para.4) that “[t]he primary duty to insure is 
placed on the employer by section 1”, Lord Carnwath continued (at paras.5-6) 
that s.5 “was at the heart of the appeal” and that it constituted an 
“unpromising basis” for the present claim. His Lordship stated (at para.6): 
“This provision does not in terms impose any duty to insure on a director or 
other officer as such, let alone any civil liability for failure to do so. The duty 
rests on the corporate employer. The veil of incorporation is pierced for a 
limited purpose. It arises only where an offence is committed by the company, 
and then in defined circumstances imposes equivalent criminal liability on the 
director or other officer on the basis, not that he is directly responsible, but 
that he is “deemed to be guilty” of the offence committed by the company.” 
Counsel for the appellant accepted that, as a general rule, where a statute 
imposed an obligation, and imposed a criminal penalty for failure to comply, 
there was no civil liability. That was subject to exceptions however, including 
the class protection exception, as discussed in Lonrho, upon which counsel 
sought to rely. Although the court accepted that the duty of the employer 
under s.1 of the 1969 Act was imposed for the benefit of employees, in the 
sense indicated by Lord Diplock in Lonrho, that was not enough for the 
appellant. “The essential starting point for Lord Diplock’s formulation is an 
obligation created by statute, binding in law on the person sought to be made 
liable” (emphasis added)(at para.13).  
There was no authority for the proposition that a person could be made 
indirectly liable for breach of an obligation imposed by statute on another and 
it was no different where the obligation was imposed on a corporate body. 
There was no basis in the case law for looking through the corporate veil to 
the directors or other individuals through whom the company acts. That could 
only be done if expressly or impliedly justified by the statute. 
Lord Carnwath compared the present case with Monk v Warbey [1935] 1 KB 
75 where the relevant provision, s.35 of the Road Traffic Act 1930, provided 
by subsection (1) that it was not lawful for any person “to use, or to cause or 
permit any other person to use” a motor vehicle on the road unless insured; 
and by subsection (2) imposed a criminal penalty on “any person” acting in 
contravention of the section. His Lordship observed that in the 1930 Act the 
legislature had dealt specifically with both the user, and any person causing or 
permitting the use, and had imposed direct responsibility on each. The 1969 
Act, by comparison, imposed direct responsibility only on the employer. Lord 
Carnwath went on to state (at para.14): ”Parliament has recognised that a 
director or officer may bear some responsibility for the failure to insure, but 
has dealt with it, not by imposing direct responsibility equivalent to that of the 
company, but by a specific and closely defined criminal penalty, itself linked to 
the criminal liability of the company.”  
The majority view (as expressed by Lord Carnwath) did not find the 
observations of Lord Drummond Young in the Inner House helpful in resolving 
the issue. The appeal did not depend on general questions of “fairness”, but 
on the interpretation of a particular statutory scheme in its context. As far as 
Lord Drummond Young’s reference to the judgment of Atkin LJ was 
concerned, the scope of a potential common law claim against a director for 
ordering or procuring a delictual act was not in issue in the instant case. 
Rather, the case turned entirely on alleged liability under the statute. This 
required the court “to pay due respect to the language and structure used by 
Parliament, rather than to preconceptions of what its objectives could or 
should have been” (para.18). 
The majority drew further support for its view from the fact that other statutory 
provisions which imposed criminal liability on directors and other officers for 
offences by their companies had not been treated as giving rise to civil 
liability. (Section 1255 of the Companies Act 2006 and s.22 of the 
Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954 were provided by way of example). 
Lord Carnwath concluded (at para.23): 
“[T]he language of section 5 was deliberately chosen and is intended to mean 
what it says. The formula is specifically directed at criminal liability, and as far 
as we know has always been used in that context. Where Parliament has 
used such a well-established formula, it is particularly difficult to infer an 
intention to impose by implication a more general liability of which there is no 
hint in its actual language.” 
For all these reasons, Lord Carnwath agreed with the conclusion reached by 
the majority of the Inner House. Lord Mance and Lord Reed agreed with Lord 
Carnwath and the appeal was accordingly dismissed. 
Lord Toulson would have allowed the appeal. He issued a dissenting 
judgment with which Lady Hale agreed in a separate dissent. For Lord 
Toulson, the effect in substance of the drafting device in s.5 of the Act (the 
deeming provision) was to place a legal obligation on a company director not 
to cause or permit the company to be without the required insurance by 
consent, connivance or neglect, on pain of a criminal penalty. In Lord 
Toulson’s view, the imposition of criminal responsibility for a specified act (or 
omission) carried with it a legal obligation not to act (or omit to act) in such a 
way. His Lordship observed that the approach favoured by the majority  
concentrated on the form of the language. The majority view was that the 
structure of the Act was such that the only duty created by it was explicitly 
placed on the company by s.1(1), and that the mechanism of the deeming 
provision was consistent with and supported that proposition. Lord Toulson, 
however, favoured a functional approach to interpreting the legislation, 
namely one “which looks at the function and substantive effect of the deeming 
provision in real terms” (para.30). In choosing between a formal or functional 
approach Lord Toulson asserted that the context was important, that context 
being “legislation for the protection of a vulnerable group, a company’s 
employees” (para.30). He agreed with Lord Drummond Young’s observation 
in the Inner House that in the context of legislation directed at employee 
protection the formalist approach is “excessively conceptual; it focuses on 
differences of structure that do not reflect the basic objectives of the statute” 
(2015 S.C. 453 at para.47). 
Although Lord Toulson preferred a functional approach to the interpretation of 
the Act, he took the view that, even if a formal approach was applied, Mr. 
Gordon would still incur liability to the appellant under the Act. On a formalist 
approach, the effect of the deeming provision, in Lord Toulson’s view, was 
that in the eye of the law the director was guilty as a principal of failing to 
insure. The language of the Act did not impose an accessory liability on him. 
Lord Toulson further observed that, since Victorian times, the courts had 
consistently held that breaches of legislation aimed at employee protection 
were actionable at the suit of the employee suffering the breach (for example, 
Groves, Black (supra)). If the legislation was silent on whether there should be 
civil liability, the judges’ role was to fill the gaps. Where legislation was passed 
to protect employees, then, in accordance with Lord Diplock’s dictum in 
Lonrho, a breach would ordinarily give rise to a cause of action, absent a clear 
statutory intention to the contrary. 
For Lady Hale, too, it was “absolutely plain” (at para.43) that Parliament did 
intend there to be civil liability towards an employee for breach of ss.1 and 5 
of the 1969 Act. Having reviewed a number of authorities, including X (Minors) 
and Morrison Sports, her Ladyship observed that the difference between 
Morrison Sports and the present case “could hardly be greater” (at para.48). 
The 1969 Act concerned a very specific statutory duty imposed upon 
employers, but also imposed upon certain officers where the employer was a 
limited company. In Lady Hale’s view, there could be no difference in 
substance between imposing criminal liability for a failure to do something and 
imposing a duty to do it. The purpose was to protect a specific class of 
people, namely employees who might be injured by the employer’s breach. 
The protection intended was that such employees should be compensated for 
their injuries even if the employer was unable to do so. The minority in the 
Supreme Court took the view that the majority’s rigid interpretation of ss.1 and 
5 of the Act actually went some way to frustrate the purpose of the Act by 
removing from employees the very protection which the Act was meant to 
bestow. Lord Toulson and Lady Hale believed that the emphasis placed by 
the majority on formality, as opposed to functionality, was wrong. That 
minority view echoed Lord Glennie’s rejection in the Outer House of “too 
narrow a reading” of the Act and Lord Drummond Young’s criticism in the 
Inner House of an “over-literal construction” or an “excessively conceptual 
approach”. 
 
Has the law changed? 
One point of particular interest arising from Campbell v Gordon is the issue of 
whether the law in this area has changed. In the Supreme Court, Lord 
Carnwath observed (at para.11) that there had been some discussion in the 
Inner House as to whether Lord Diplock’s statement of the “class protection” 
exception in Lonrho represented the modern law. Lord Brodie thought that it 
must be seen in the light of more recent judicial statements which appeared to 
place less emphasis on definitive presumptions, and more on the need to 
ascertain the intention of Parliament in enacting the particular provision 
(paras.10, 20). Those more recent judicial statements were to be found in the 
speeches of Lord Rodger in Morrison Sports, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in X 
(Minors) and Lord Jauncey in the Parkhurst case. Lord Carnwath observed (at 
para.12) however “that the statements of Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord 
Jauncey ..were made in the context of cases concerning liability of public 
authorities, which may raise rather different issues.” Lord Carnwath was 
therefore “content to assume (without deciding) that Lord Diplock’s words 
remain a reliable guide at least in relation to statutory duties imposed for the 
benefit of employees.” (at para.12)  
Lord Toulson was more forthright, castigating as a “startling” proposition Lord 
Brodie’s suggestion that the dicta of Lord Kinnear in Black and of Lord Diplock 
in Lonrho were “not the modern law” (at para.38). The dicta to which Lord 
Brodie made reference in support of his assertion were made in cases which 
were “far removed” from the area of legislation aimed at employee protection.” 
In X (Minors), Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to Groves, Cutler and Lonrho 
and nowhere suggested that he considered those cases to be “not the 
modern law”. Lord Toulon stated that “[h]ad [Lord Browne-Wilkinson] intended 
to depart from long standing authority, including decisions of the House of 
Lords, there can be no doubt that he would have said so” (para.39). Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson’s reference to Parkhurst was made simply as an example 
of legislation which was not passed for the benefit of a particular class of 
persons (prisoners), but for the benefit of society in general. (That case 
concerned a prisoner who had been unlawfully segregated in breach of the 
Prison Rules.) Lord Jauncey’s statement in Parkhurst, at pp.170-171, that 
“[t]he fact that a particular provision was intended to protect certain individuals 
is not of itself sufficient to confer private law rights of action upon them, 
something more is required to show that the legislature intended such 
conferment” was not to be taken in isolation. Indeed, in the immediately 
succeeding paragraph, Lord Jauncey described the objects of the legislation 
as “far removed from those of legislation such as the factories and coal mines 
Acts whose prime concern is to protect the health and safety of those who 
work therein”.  
Lord Toulson observed that, in the present case, the 1969 Act had no purpose 
other than the protection of employees and concluded (at para.41): 
”The principles summarised by Lord Diplock in Lonrho..are no more than 
general principles or default rules, but they have stood the test of time and I 
would hold that they continue to be the law unless and until the Supreme 
Court makes a conscious decision otherwise.”  
In Lady Hale’s view, it was “quite wrong” to suggest that the trilogy of recent 
cases had changed the law as it has long been understood to be. In none of 
the trilogy (X (Minors), Parkhurst and Morrison Sports) was there any 
suggestion that the courts’ approach to deciding whether breach of a statutory 
duty gives rise to civil liability has changed. Indeed, in X (Minors), the 
principles applicable were said to be “well-established”, albeit difficult to apply 
(p.731). Her Ladyship stated (at para.44):”Statutory duties imposed upon 
employers for the benefit of employees who suffer injury as a result of their 
breach give rise to civil as well as criminal liability, absent a clear statutory 
intent to the contrary. That is still the law.” 
 
Conclusion  
Campbell v Gordon presented the courts with an opportunity to reconsider 
whether the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 supported 
an action for breach of statutory duty against a director of an insolvent 
corporate employer. It was perhaps unsurprising that the matter would come 
before the Supreme Court in view of the conflicting authorities which existed 
in the shape of Richardson and Quinn. The Supreme Court ultimately held 
that the sole director of a company which failed to provide adequate insurance 
for its employees was not personally liable in damages to an employee who 
suffered an injury while working. While Parliament had allowed the corporate 
veil to be pierced to the extent that directors might be guilty of a criminal 
offence, it had not intended directors to attract civil liability for breach of 
statutory duty. As Lord Carnwath observed, the Act said nothing about civil 
liability. The case therefore provides an important precedent for other civil 
cases brought against individual directors. 
A further point of interest of the Supreme Court’s decision lies in its express 
recognition of the fact that the law remains as stated in Black and Lonrho. 
The trilogy of cases discussed in the Inner House (Parkhurst, X (Minors) and 
Morrison Sports) had not changed the law. Lord Carnwath, delivering the 
majority opinion, (at para.12) was “content to assume” that Lord Diplock’s 
words in Lonrho remained a reliable guide at least in relation to statutory 
duties imposed for the benefit of employees, while any suggestion to the 
contrary was described by Lord Toulson as “startling” (at para.38) and by 
Lady Hale as “quite wrong” (at para.45). 
 
A further observation arising from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Campbell 
is that it seems to follow an apparent trend not to read civil liability into 
statutory duties. Stanton et al have identified “a general disinclination to infer 
the tort ..in the modern cases.” (K Stanton et al, Statutory Torts (Thomson/ 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at para.2.009). The Supreme Court’s judgment might 
therefore be viewed as reaffirmation of that trend. Perhaps not too much 
should be made of this point however in view of the fact that many of the 
modern cases have involved construction of regulatory legislation which is for 
the public benefit and such legislation tends not to support a civil right of 
action for breach of statutory duty. 
A final observation should be made. The question in Campbell was essentially 
whether the 1969 Act supported a civil law remedy at the instance of an 
injured employee against a sole director of an uninsured and insolvent 
corporate employer. The Outer House answered that question in the 
affirmative, the Inner House (by majority) gave a negative response and the 
Supreme Court by the narrowest of margins (in a 3:2 decision) affirmed the 
decision of the Inner House. Ultimately, four of the nine judges who heard this 
case would have allowed civil liability to be maintained against the director in 
respect of the statutory breach while five would not. The judicial path of the 
litigation would therefore appear to support the view that this is an “often 
difficult and controversial area of law.” (per Neuberger J in Todd v Adams 
[2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 293 at p.300). While some of the judges in Campbell 
took a purposive or functional approach to the interpretation of the 1969 Act’s 
provisions, others preferred a more rigid, formalist approach. It was that latter 
approach which would ultimately prevail with the result that, some 10 years 
after sustaining his injuries, Mr. Campbell’s action based on breach of 
statutory duty was finally dismissed by the Supreme Court. The course of the 
litigation in Campbell demonstrates how judicial responses to any particular 
piece of legislation may differ quite dramatically. This makes it difficult for 
litigants and their advisers to predict whether a particular legislative regime 
will support an action for breach of statutory duty. Protracted and expensive 
litigation may ensue often with a disappointing outcome, such as that faced by 
Mr. Campbell. It is suggested that reform of the law is urgently required.  
 
The need for reform 
The existence of a right of action for breach of statutory duty is said to depend 
upon the intention of the legislature but, sadly, that intention is often unstated. 
Where Parliament “prefers to avoid the crudity of a blunt statement ” (Cutler, 
supra, per Lord du Parcq at p.411) the courts are left to divine the legislature’s 
intention. They have “the active role of filling gaps left by the legislature” 
(Campbell, per Lord Toulson at para.35). While certain presumptions or 
indicators have been developed to assist in this regard, those indicators often 
interact with other considerations such as the type of loss suffered (e.g. 
physical injury as opposed to pure economic loss), the manner in which the 
duties are articulated (e.g. highly specific as opposed to more vague or 
general duties), and whether the statutory regime is merely regulatory in 
nature. As far as the presumptions and their exceptions are concerned, it can 
be difficult to identify for whose protection the legislation was promulgated 
(this, it will be remembered, prompted different responses from members of 
the judiciary in Richardson and Quinn.) In seeking to ascertain Parliament’s 
intention, the courts may find that some factors point to a different conclusion 
from others. It is scarcely surprising therefore that Lord Denning M.R. 
suggested in Island Records, supra (at p.135) that one simply tosses a coin to 
decide the matter. Academic commentators have been similarly critical with 
some having described the determination of Parliament’s intention as a 
“haphazard process” (J F Clerk & WHB Lindsell; Torts; (21st edn., A Dugdale, 
M Jones and M Simpson ed., Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014), at 
para.9-02) while others have described the judicial techniques of construction 
as “inadequate and .. liable to lead to arbitrary results.” (K Stanton et al, 
Statutory Torts, supra, at para.1.009).  
If the need for reform is accepted, the question then arises as to what shape 
that reform should take. An obvious improvement would be express 
articulation of the legislative intention in new legislation. In 1949, a judicial 
plea was issued in the following terms: 
“To a person unversed in the science or art of legislation it may well seem 
strange that Parliament has not by now made it a rule to state explicitly what 
its intention is in a matter which is often of no little importance, instead of 
leaving it to the courts to discover, by a careful examination and analysis of 
what is expressly said, what that intention may be supposed probably to be. 
There are no doubt reasons which inhibit the legislature from revealing its 
intention in plain words. I do not know, and must not speculate, what those 
reasons may be. I trust, however, that it will not be thought impertinent…to 
suggest respectfully that those who are responsible for framing legislation 
might consider whether the traditional practice, which obscures, if it does not 
conceal, the intention which Parliament has, or must be presumed to have, 
might not safely be abandoned.” (Cutler, supra, at p.410 per Lord du Parcq).  
Some thirty years later, the legislature stood charged of having “ignored the 
plea of Lord du Parcq in Cutler’s case” (per Lord Denning M.R. in Island 
Records, supra, at p.134). 
Clearly if Parliament were to state its intention explicitly in new legislation, this 
would be a major step forward. While existing legislation might still provoke 
difficulties, these difficulties would diminish with the passage of time as older 
legislation is gradually swept away. As Lord du Parcq acknowledged, 
however, there may be “reasons which inhibit the legislature from revealing its 
intention in plain words.” It may not be considered politically prudent for 
Parliament to make express provision on the issue of civil liability. What then 
are the alternatives? In 1969, in a joint report, the Law Commission and the 
Scottish Law Commission recommended the adoption of a new rule of 
statutory construction whereby a presumption of actionability in respect of 
duties imposed by statute would apply. (The Interpretation of Statutes (Law 
Com. No. 21)(Scot Law Com. No. 11)(1969) at para.38.) The presumption 
would operate unless express provision was made to the contrary. No action 
followed however. Stanton et al, by contrast, favour a presumption in the 
opposite direction (i.e. non–actionability), unless express provision is made to 
the contrary: 
“This would produce a result close to the present law but free from its 
difficulties. On the debit side, it would remove the possibility of the courts 
utilising the tort to play new roles or to plug gaps in the overall picture of legal 
protection. This would not be a great loss in view of the uncertainty which 
must exist at present as to whether rights are going to be inferred and the 
general tendency to deny a remedy….[T]his would be the best way of 
removing the existing difficulties whilst allowing the tort to evolve on a 
principled basis.” (K Stanton et al, Statutory Torts, supra, at para.2.042). 
Although different views may be taken as to what direction legal reform in this 
area might take, it is submitted (as the present author has previously stated) 
that “reform of the law in this area is urgently required in order to provide 
greater clarity and to obviate the arid and wasteful litigation which the current 
position undoubtedly generates.” (J Thomson (ed.), Delict, supra, at 
para.6.133). Until such time as reform of the law is effected, “guesswork 
puzzles” such as the one presented to the judiciary in Campbell are likely to 
remain a feature of the legal landscape.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
